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HE philosophy of the eighteenth century in France, taken as a
whole, presents so striking a contrast with that of the seventeenth century that the passage from the one to the other would be
hardly intelligible did we not meet, as early as the end of the seventeenth century, with thinkers who, though of secondary rank, were
yet bold and original, and who distinctly heralded the approaching era. In the seventeenth century speculative reason, having
finally freed itself from Scholasticism and the authority of the ancients, declared its absolute independence and made the freest use
of it. It attempted a rational construction of the universe, by intimately uniting metaphysics and physics and endeavored to realise
the ideal of an intuitive and deductive science, which should be to
the totality of natural phenomena what mathematics is to numbers
and figures. In religion it was independent in fact but respectful
in form. With Descartes and Gassendi, it refrained from touching
upon sacred subjects; with Malebranche and Leibniz it flattered
itself upon having established the conformity of reason with faith.
Political and social problems; at least in France, it carefully abstained from entering upon,-doubtless from caution, but also because it felt that the method was lacking to enable it to do so successfully.
The eighteenth century presents a very different aspect. It is
here difficult to discover what the prevailing philosophy really is
for the precise reason that philosophy is everywhere,-in tragedies,
novels, history, political economy. Everyone is more or less of a
philosopher. Yet no one makes the least original effort to conceive reality in its unity. Metaphysical problems are neglected, or
at most are dealt with separately, without a thought of their mu-
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tual dependency and without any controlling idea to give to them
unity and to render the results harmonious. They are no longer attractive in themselves; the interest people seemingly take in them
conceals an ulterior object. At the same time, the attitude of
philosophers towards religion has totally changed. The majority,
instead of seeking a peaceful compromise with revealed religion,
assail it openly; many of them going so far as to attack natural
religion, while they nearly all proclaim morals to be independent
of religious dogma. Political, social, and pedagogical problems become the chief objects of study with philosophers. As the Church
had, from time immemorial, given undisp'lted solutions of these
questions, the matter was, so to speak, a new one. People took to
it eagerly. They were anxious to occupy this new and wide domain, which was but just opened, and rushed forward to take
complete and immediate possession of it. At the same time the
influence of the natural sciences, which were progressing more
slowly but more surely, increased as new discoveries were made,
and gradually prepared the way for a new form of philosophical
speculation, which soon set in.
The principles of Descartes were, as we have seen, in great
measure responsible for the formation of a philosophy different
from his own. Descartes himself sedulously avoided the discussion of political and social questions; but that his successors should
have so applied the philosophy of "clear ideas," was inevitable.
In the same way, the precaution he had taken to "set apart" the
truths of faith was not equivalent to a treaty of peace with theology, accepted on both sides, and definitive. It was merely a
truce, destined soon to be broken. The conflict was so inevitable
that, even had theologians been perfectly reconciled to Cartesianism, the strife would nevertheless have been brought on soon thereafter, by the natural development of philosophical thought alone.
If Cartesianism was looked upon su·spiciously by Pascal, it did not
alarm his friends at Port Royal: Arnauld and Nicole in their Logic
showed themselves staunch Cartesians. Nor did the most illustrious of the leaders of the French Roman Catholic Church, Bossuet and Fenelon, conceal their sympathy for the philosophy of
Descartes, being, as it seems, more desirous of finding Cartesianism conformable to the teaching of the orthodox doctrine, than of
combating it in the name of the latter. It was from the ranks of
philosophers themselves that serious hostilities began. Pure Cartesians these opponents were not i but they followed, more boldly
than Descartes himself, the way he had laid open; and if they dif-
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fered from him, it was chiefly in applying his method and principles at the very points where he had abstained from so doing.
On the other hand there had been running, throughout the
seventeenth century, a more or less hidden, but uninterrupted,
undercurrent of opposition to the spiritualistic philosophy, which
was then predominant, and above all to Christian philosophy.
Being Epicureans in spirit, taste, and often in morals, and unbelievers in matters of religion, the "libertines" were naturally
drawn to doctrines which were in accordance with their tendencies. They welcomed the empiricism of Gassendi; they would
readily have espoused materialism, had the latter openly declared
itself, and the most intelligent among them were not long in guessing the advantage which the cause of unbelief would draw from the
method and physics of Descartes. All this, however, was not
worked out, made clear, and openly presented to the public. To
find the real precursors of the philosophy of the eighteenth century, we must go to the last quarter of the seventeenth. There
then appeared two minds quite different from each other in all
things save in one: that they both sowed many seeds which were
soon to bear fruit. These meh were Bayle and Fontenelle.
If by "philosopher" we understand a man whose ideas concerning the great metaphysical problems form a definite system,
Bayle must be refused that name, for he pleads the natural weakness of the human mind, and takes refuge in a modest kind of scepticism. He should rather be called a scholar, a commentator of
the ancients, a historian of theological controversies, and, above all,
a journalist. Nothing interests and diverts him more than the
Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres. He was born a Protestant,
was converted to Roman Catholicism, but almost immediately after
relapsed to Protestantism, on which account not being allowed
to dwell in France, he finally fixed his residence in Rotterdam.
He was not a daring man, at least in no respect did he appear so.
His aspect was rather that of a person of the sixteenth century
than of one of the eighteenth. He published large folios, full of
learned discussions, and loved to point out and correct the mistakes of other scholars whose works nobody read. He liked not
only history, but the crumbs of history, half buried in the dust of
dictionaries. Such a universal and greedy curiosity cannot but
seem harmless; and if peradventure a bold expression here and
there causes the reader to prick up his ears, he is soon reassured.
It required a keen insight to discover, amid such inexhaustible and
minute erudition, constantly busied with almost forgotten things,
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an engine of war destruc tive of nearly all that the sevent eenth
century held certain and sacred. Nevert heless that engine was
there,
or at least it came from there. And Voltair e had good reason
for
eulogis ing the immor tal Bayle as "the pride of the human
species. "
One neither can nor ought to give a system atic accoun t
of
ideas which their own author explici tly neglec ted to unite
into a
system . But Bayle's ideas, though not strictly linked togethe
r,
are yet cohere nt. They centre about certain leading points,
to
which Bayle always reverts even when we least expect him
to do
so; and these points themse lves have as ·a commo n centre
namely , the relatio ns betwee n revelat ion and reason, with
all the
conseq uences which the solutio n of that questio n involve s.
Bayle boldly asserts at times that there can be no such thing
as opposi ng reason. For there is, he declare s, a distinc t and
vivid
light which shines upon all men the momen t they open the
eyes of
their attenti on: it is God Himsel f, the essenti al and substan
tial
Truth, who then enlight ens them immed iately. It is in vain
for
one to try to deny this light. There are axioms which we
cannot
questio n, howeve r hard we may try. We cannot believe that
the
whole is not greater than the part. Even though the opposi
te
statem ent should be cited in Scriptu re a hundre d times,
man,
such as he is, would not believe it. Theref ore let nobody
say
that theolog y is a queen to which philoso phy is a serving
-maid
merely ; for the theolog ians themse lves, by their very behavi
or,
confess that philoso phy is the queen and theolog y the servan
t.
Hence the exertio ns and contort ions which they inflict upon
their
minds to avoid being accuse d of a conflic t with genuin e philoso
phy.
They would certain ly not exert themse lves so much if they did
not
tacitly admit that the authori ty of any dogma not confirm ed,
examined, and recorde d in the suprem e parliam ent of reason and
naturalligh t, is "wave ring, and fragile as glass."
Had Bayle always spoken thus he would have not only presaged but foresta lled the eightee nth century . But then he
would
have shocke d the great majori ty of his contem porarie s. Being
condemne d as irreligi ous and impiou s, he would have been
far less
read, and his influen ce would have been infinite ly more restrict
ed.
He usually speaks a much more cautiou s langua ge. Not
only is
he a believe r, but he repudi ates utterly the accusa tion of heresy.
He objects to being mistak en for a Socinia n, who refuses
to believe in the Trinity and the Incarnation as contrary to natura
llight.
He even goes further . In the case of a conflic t betwee
n
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revelation and reason, the latter must yield. For, could reason
lead us to a knowledge of truth, the token of this would be evidence. Now there are things entirely evident which a Christian rejects as false. Thus, says Bayle, you reject the axiom of
identity when you accept the Trinity, the Eucharist, and Transsubstantiation. Those who lived before the Gospel did not hesitate to accept as true some very evident propositions; but the
mysteries of our theology have shown that these propositions, in
spite of their evidence, are false. Let us profit by this lesson, and,
in order not to fall into errors like those of the heathen, and thus
less excusable, let us hold nothing as certainly true, save what is
taught by the Church.
But let us notice the very special motives which Bayle gives
for this attitude, apparently so submissive. Let us hear him speak
to philosophers and theologians by turns. "Do not try to understand mysteries," he says to the former; "if you could understand
them they would be mysteries no longer. Do not even try to lessen
their apparent absurdity. Your reason here is utterly powerless;
and who knows but that absurdity may be an essential ingredient of
mystery? Believe, as Christians; but as philosophers, abstain."
And, turning to theologians: "You are quite right in demanding
that we should believe; but make this demand in the name of authority only, and do not be so imprudent as to try to justify your
belief in the eyes of reason. God has willed it so, God has done
so: therefore it is good and true, wisely done, and wisely permitted. Do not venture any further. If you enter into detailed reasons for all this you will never come to an end, and, after a thousand disputes, you will be compelled to fall back upon your original
reason of authority. In this matter, the best use to make of reason
is not to reason. Moreover, if you condescend to discuss the point,
you will be beaten. You wish that truth, that is, revelation, should
always have the best reasons on its side. You wish this to be so,
and you imagine it to be so. What a gross mistake! How could
a theologian'S answers regarding mysteries, which are beyond the
reach of reason, be as clear as a philosopher's objections? From
the very fact of a dogma being mysterious and utterly incomprehensible to weak human understanding, it naturally follows that
our reason will combat it with very strong arguments, and can find
no other satisfactory solution than the authority of God.
"This is precisely what theologians do not often admit. Because I think the reasons they give in favor of the dogma are
weak, they conclude that I do not believe in the dogma. I should
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not indeed believe if God had not bidden me to do so; but He
commands and I submit. But He does not bid me hold demonstrations as sound when they are not. Theologians must choose:
either they must affirm their dogmas in the name of a supernatural
light, without discussion; or, if they discuss them, they must not
assume that they alone have the privilege of possessing truth. But
they nearly always adopt a third method: they choose to discuss,
and pretend to be right beforehand. If anyone candidly and undisguisedly points out the strength of the contrary opinion, he
makes himself odious and suspicious. Indeed, even theologians
themselves scruple to state the strongest arguments urged against
them, lest these should produce too forcible an impression upon
the reader. These arguments they conceal, out of charity and zeal
ftJr truth. Was not Cardinal Bellarmin reproached for his candid
statement of the reasons alleged by heretics, on the ground that it
was prejudicial? "
If therefore a theologian desires to act prudently, while remaining sincere, he must abstain from entering upon a discussion
in which he is sure not to prevail. He must present mysteries as
they are, that is, as incomprehensible and absurd. The Christian
will nevertheless believe in them, since they were revealed by God
Himself. It is his sole reason for believing in them: but fortunately this reason is indisputable. One does not raise objections
against God.
Yet Bayle did raise objections; and the strictures which he
preferred against Providence elicited, as everybody knows, the
Thlodide of Leibniz. According to Bayle, if we look upon things
in a human way, i. e., from the point of view of mere reason, the
partisans of Providence find it dIfficult to prove that everything in
the universe is the work of Providence, and equally difficult to defend themselves against the Manicheans, who maintain that a principle of good and a ptinciple of evil are continually at strife in the
universe, and that neither is able to triumph over the other. No
doubt, as God is all-powerful and all- bounteous, his work cannot
but be the best possible, and we thence naturally infer the existence of Providence. But does experience confirm this reasoning?
It does not: we see that man is wicked and miserable. Was the
Creator unable or unwilling to make him otherwise? In both cases
it is very difficult to defend Providence. Were there nowadays,
says Bayle, Marcionites as skilled in disputation as are either the
Jesuits or the J ansenists, they would not have advanced three syllogisms ere they had compelled their adversaries to confess that
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they did not understand their own assertions, and that we come
here to the verge of the unfathomable abyss of the sovereignty of
the Creator, in which our reason is lost, there remaining nothing
but faith to uphold as. A pagan philosopher would here have an
advantage over the Christian.
It is evident that evil should be prevented, if possible. Now
God does not prevent all the disorders in the world, and yet it was
most easy for Him to do so. It is also evident that a non-existent
creature cannot be an accomplice to an evil deed, and it ought not
in justice to be punished later on therefor. And yet, does not God
allow all men to suffer the consequences of the original sin? Can
this sin justify all the sufferings in the world? The conclusion is:
Believe in Revelation. "Revelation is the only store-house from
which arguments can be produced against such people; by it
alone can we refute the so-called eternity of the evil principle."
Leibniz had much ado to refute Bayle's objections. He shows
indeed that the hypothesis of the Manicheans is shallow and that
nothing is easier and more insignificant than to suppose a special
principle in order to explain facts which puzzle us. But this
Bayle is perfectly willing to grant him. Does Leibniz in his turn
succeed in proving man's liberty and vindicating Providence?
Hardly. The liberty which Leibniz recognises in man is a form
of determinism merely; and his proposed explanation of the existence of evil in the universe, perhaps the least unsatisfactory that
could be given, has but one fault; but the fault is a serious
one. It forces its readers into pessimism. If this world be indeed
the best of all possible worlds, Candide is not wrong in thinking it
bad. We must therefore agree with Bayle that Revelation is our
only resource here, and that reason, pure and simple, does not
bear out the same conclusion.
But, one might object, the origin of evil, the cause of sin, and
the relation of God to the world, are purely speculative questions,
raised only by metaphysicians; and if reason finds it no easy thing
to agree with Revelation on these points, it has quite as much difficulty in agreeing with itself when thrown on its own resources.
Human reason, says Bayle, is a principle of destruction and not of
edification; it is fitted only for raising doubts, and for evasions.
"It therefore matters little if it runs counter to Revelation on
problems which are beyond its reach. At least we clearly see that
the two agree on questions connected with practical life, that faith
engenders virtue, and that religion sanctions the supreme rule of
conduct. Here no difficulties or bbjections appear.
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True, says Bayle, but on one condition: religion must teach
nothing contrary to morals. No doubt it is unlikely to do so; yet
sometimes it does. Indeed have we not heard Fathers of the
Church declaring, and contemporary priests repeating after them,
that compulsion should be used to bring refractory people to the
orthodox faith? Hence sprang the persecutions against heretics,
the dragonades; hence the Protestants were hunted, pillaged, imprisoned, sent to the galleys, their children kidnapped, and their
clergymen hanged; hence all the other methods of violent conversion set in motion when the Edict of Nantes was revoked. Now,
not only are these proceedings absurd and even prejudicial to their
own end; not only are these persecutions cruel and abominable,
but the maxim that justifies them is based on a wrong principle.
God cannot have said" Compelle z"ntrare." Just as there is no
right against right, there is no Revelation against Revelation.
Now, in moral matters, the first revelation is that of the conscience,
"the true light which lighteth every man which cometh into the
world."
Bayle is here decidedly more affirmative than usual, and the
cause is evidently the indignation he feels at beholding the persecutions. "If anybody presumes to assert that God has revealed
to us a moral maxim in direct opposition to the first principles of
all morals, we must deny the assertion, and maintain that such a
person is misinterpreting the text, and that one ought rather to reject the testimony of one's criticism and grammar than that of one's
reason. God cannot contradict himself. If the Scripture does not
agree with our conscience, it is because we misunderstand the
Scripture. And whatever contests may arise, conscience must
always have the last word. For instance, it tells us that sincere
ignorance is guiltless, and that a man cannot be responsible for a
fault which he commits, without knowing that he commits it. We
cannot therefore believe that a heretic or even an infidel, if he is
sincere, can be punished by God for anything but for evil deeds
which he may have done while knowing them to be evil. As for
the deeds he may have done with a secure conscience-I mean a
conscience which he has not himself maliciously blinded-I cannot
be persuaded that they are crimes.
Likewise, the stories in the Bible are not always edifying. If
they shock my conscience, shall I abstain from condemning them?
Because David, for instance, partook of God's inspiration, shall I
not look upon him as a murderer, an ungrateful man, an adulterer?
If the Scripture, in relating a deed, blames or praises it, nobody is
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allowed to appeal from its judgment; we must all make our praise
and blame conform to the pattern of the Scripture. But if the Holy
Ghost has not qualified it we must not hesitate to censure what
we think is a crime. There is no medium course: either such actions are worthless, or they are not wrong. Of these alternatives,
our conscience can accept only the first.
Further, viewing the question more generally, religious faith
does not seem to have any influence whatever upon men's manners. We have only to look about us. If we examine the morals
of Christians, their lewd deeds, their scandals, their craftiness, and
all that they do in order to procure money, or to obtain offices, or
to supplant competitors, we shall find that they could hardly be
more licentious, even if they did not believe in immortality. We
shall find that, as a rule, they abstain only from such deeds as
would expose them to infamy, or to the gallows, two checks which
might restrain the corruption of a godless man as easily as it does
theirs. A great many rogues and scoundrels believe in the immortality of the soul, whereas many godly and righteous men do not.
Soldiers may be irreproachable in their faith, and indulge in all
sorts of excesses. This is also seen in some women. There is
nothing inexplicable about it. It is not the general opinions of the
mind which determine our actions: it is the present passions of
the heart; and, as the English psychologists of the nineteenth century very rightly say, "cognition does not produce action." Thus
(always excepting those who are led by God's spirit), the faith a
man has in a religion is no guarantee for his conduct. On the contrary, it is often quite apt to rouse in his soul anger against those
who think differently, fear, and a kind of zeal for devotional practice, in the hope that outward actions, and a public confession of
the true faith, will screen his disorderly life and gain pardon for
it some day.
Thence arise consequences which we can hardly deny Bayle,
and which are momentous ones. If believing in certain dogmas
has no necessary influence on the conduct of man, we may truly
say that morals are independent of belief. If Christians who are
"irreproachable as regards faith" lead an evil life, we must needs
infer that rightful conduct is not inseparable from orthodoxy. We
may therefore imagine a state composed of men believing neither
in the existence of God nor in an after-life. Were they, however,
zealous in preserving the public good, in checking malefactors, in
preventing quarrels, in upholding the rights of widows and Ot;phans, in encouraging fairness in business, who can doubt but such
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a state would be a highly civilised one? Throughout the eighteenth
century this hypothesis of a "society of atheists" proposed by
Bayle, is discussed, and though some, as Voltaire, for instance,
may have been made uneasy by it, it still remains, for many others,
a sort of ideal.
Recapitulating Bayle's views of the mysteries of religion and
of belief in the supernatural, it appears that from the point of view
of knowledge, such mysteries are offensive to reason and seem absurd; in a moral point of view, they do not make man any better,
and are, to say the least, useless. What is to be inferred from
this? That we may dispense with the belief in the supernatural
and with mysteries; that we must seek what is good and true by
human reason alone? Far from it. Bayle's conclusion is in direct
opposition to this. Behold, he says in substance, the weakness
and helplessness of human reason! If God did not teach us the
truth, would our reason bring us to it? Reason is very far from it,
and is ignorant of the ways that lead to it. Therefore, how much
gratitude do we owe to Divine Kindness, that has especially revealed to us through the Scripture what we should never have discovered by ourselves and what would even seem to us absurd and
unacceptable, were it not corroborated in this way.
One cannot carry submission farther. How can a man be suspected of impiety who does not hesitate a moment to silence reason when Revelation speaks? Still we may question whether this
submission is without reserve, if this respectfulness comes from the
heart or only from the lips. If he is sincere why does not Bayle,
after the example of Malebranche, seek to make the inward revelation, which is our reason and conscience, agree with the outward
revelation, which is the Scripture? Why does he purposely insist
on the impossibility of making acceptable to reason what religion
commands us to believe? And if insincere, his language becomes
a dreadful irony. Then Bayle's defence of religion looks like an
organised attack upon it: when he speaks of the "weakness and
helplessness of reason," he really means the incomprehensibility
and absurdity of revelation. In a word, with a show of deep respect, he patiently destroys one after another, all motives for believing in Christian dogmas. When he has finished, revealed religion can no longer hold its own; it is on the verge of ruin.
Therefore the works of Bayle, particularly his Dictionary, were
an inexhaustible store for the unbelievers of the eighteenth century. To take but one instance among a thousand, this is how he
foreshadows those who are to take advantage of the defects in
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the sacred texts. "Were such an account to be found in Thucydides or Livy, all critics would unanimously conclude that the
copyists had transposed the pages, forgotten something in one
place, repeated something in another, or inserted spurious passages amidst the work of the author. But we must beware of such
suspicions when the Bible is in question. Nevertheless, there
have been persons bold enough to maintain that all the chapters or
verses in the First Book of Samuel do not occupy the place they
originally had." Suffer this cautious remark to pass and all of
modern Biblical exegesis follows.
It accordingly matters little that Bayle is incapable of systematic thought; that he appears now as a Cartesian, and now as a Pyrrhonian, that at one time evidence dispels his doubt, and that
again his doubt overcomes all evidence; and that he actually seems
to take pleasure in these contradictions. The eddies no not prevent us from clearly perceiving the direction of the stream. Bayle
is bent on nothing less than breaking up the system of belief and
principles commonly accepted by his predecessors and contemporaries. This system was one of "Christian-rationalism." Bayle
shows that a choice is imperative: either one must be a rationalist
and cease to be a Christian; or be a Christian, and forego reason
altogether. Scriptural texts had been relied on: Bayle gives us
to understand that these texts are not proof against criticism. Religion had been looked upon as the basis of morals: Bayle proves
that morals depend solely upon the conscience, and that religion,
even the true religion, has no influence whatever upon men's conduct. It was thought-at least in France-that royalty was of divine right; but, says Bayle, "if we do not more often see kings
dethroned, it is because the nations have not been worked upon by
clever enough intrigues." We might make the enumeration longer:
for the" prejudices" were not few that Bayle attacked. No one,
indeed, was to go further than this precursor of the Enlightenment. And even in our days his conception of morals as independent of religion and metaphysics seems to many people dangerously
bold.

